Communications data plays a critical role in helping those public authorities whose responsibility it is to keep us safe to do their jobs. Assistant Commissioner John Yates of the Metropolitan Police has said that:
“The availability of Communications Data to investigators is absolutely crucial. Its importance to investigating the threat of terrorism and serious crime cannot be overstated.
Communications Data helps us save lives, provides us with opportunities to develop investigative leads, establishes the links between co-conspirators in the most serious of crimes, and assists us in the apprehension of fugitives from justice.
Finally, in a significant number of the most serious of cases, Communications Data provides the vital evidence that supports a successful prosecution of the offenders.
Without its continued availability, I am concerned that our ability to successfully investigate a wide range of crimes would be severely hampered.”
Communications data is used by a number of public authorities specified by Parliament to protect the public. These public authorities include the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the emergency services. Data may also be obtained in more limited circumstances by local authorities when they are carrying out their statutory responsibilities to combat crime1.
In 2007-8 there were 519,2602 acquisitions of communications data under RIPA Part 1, Chapter II. Of this figure, a very small proportion (1,707 or 0.3%) involved acquisition of communications data by local authorities3.
The Interception Commissioner confirmed that, “the intelligence agencies, police forces and other law enforcement agencies are the principal users of communications data”.4
The Serious Organised Crime Agency has reported that, in 2006-7, lawful interception and communications data contributed to the recovery of £29m of criminal assets and stolen cash; 151 firearms being taken off the UK streets with the arrest of a number of gang members; some 830 arrests and the seizure of 3.5 tonnes of Class A drugs; and the rendering of assistance in 35 threat to life situations, leading to the prevention of a number of murders.
Communications data has four principle uses:
I. Building a picture of a suspect and a network of contacts
Communications data can provide a fast, secure and accurate indication of the activities and contacts of a suspected criminal or terrorist. Attributing these individuals to particular phone numbers or communications devices would be virtually impossible without using communications data. That data also allows the appropriate authorities to link a suspected terrorist or criminal to a network or gang to which they belong.
Communications data is therefore vital to counter-terrorism. It has played a significant part in almost all major Security Service investigations over the last decade.
Case study: a terrorist investigation
In June 2007 two separate attempted bomb attacks occurred in London’s West End and at Glasgow airport.
The subsequent police investigation used communications data extensively to establish the chain of events that led up to the attempted bombings, and as evidence in the trial. Phone records showed that the two conspirators established contact in February 2007.
Mobile phones, that police established had been used by one of the conspirators before the attacks, were used as triggers for attempting to detonate the bombs in London’s West End. This was later used as evidence to help to convict the bomber who survived his attack on Glasgow airport.
Case study: a drugs arrest
A search of a Dutch-registered vehicle recovered 40 kilos of heroin, 150 kilos of amphetamine, 556 kilos of ecstasy tablets and 15 kilos of ecstasy powder with an estimated street value of £19 million.
Eight mobile telephones were seized from the driver and the intended recipients. Combining physical evidence recovered from crime scenes with the associated communications data from these mobile phones enabled the investigating team to link the Sheffield based drug supplier and his brother and associates to the drugs seized from the lorry. This allowed further arrests and prosecutions to be brought.
Case study: protecting vulnerable children
A 10-month international police investigation into an online peer-to-peer network was coordinated by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP).
The investigation centred on a network used by paedophiles to request, trade and create hundreds of child abuse images.
Through the investigation 700 suspects were identified in 35 countries around the world. This was only possible through the use of communications data and covert internet investigative techniques.
As a result over 30 children were rescued from sexual abuse.
II. Providing evidence in criminal prosecutions
Communications data is used extensively as evidence in court. Bill Hughes, Director General of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, states that:
“using communications data and intercept intelligence are key factors in over 95% of the most significant investigations directed at the Serious Organised Crime groups assessed as causing the most harm to the UK.”
It is also used in most major terrorist trials.
Case study: the murder of Rhys Jones
On 22nd August 2007, Rhys Jones, an 11-year-old schoolboy, was shot dead in the car park of the Fir Tree pub in Croxteth, Liverpool. He was walking home from football practice when he became the innocent victim of a feud between two rival gangs.
Following a long and difficult investigation Sean Mercer was arrested, charged and subsequently convicted of the murder. Six other members of the gang were also convicted of assisting an offender and possession of prohibited firearms.
Communications data was used to attribute telephones to each of the offenders, demonstrate association at key times and place individuals at specific locations. It also showed that the telephones of the key offenders were in the Kirby area some twenty minutes after the murder – helping to establish that Mercer and other convicted associates attended business premises in order to burn the gunman’s clothing and douse him in petrol to remove firearms discharge residue.
Communications data was essential to bringing the perpetrators to justice.
Case study: the murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman
In 2002, during the investigation into the murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham, Cambridgeshire, communications data from mobile phones exposed flaws in Ian Huntley’s alibi. Data from Holly and Jessica’s mobile phones showed that they had been in or very close to his house. Records of calls and text messages between Mr Huntley and his ex-girlfriend, Maxine Carr, also showed that she was in Grimsby when Mr Huntley killed the victims and that she deliberately misled the police over his whereabouts.
Case study: the murder of Sana Ali
In May 2007 Sana Ali was stabbed to death at her home address in Bury. Her husband had been having an affair with another woman, Harmohinder Sanghera, who was subsequently convicted of the murder.
The prosecution relied on the discovery of mobile phone location data which showed that Sanghera had travelled to Bury and back from her home address in Birmingham on the day the crime was committed.
Similar data also demonstrated to the jury that Sana Ali’s husband was elsewhere at the time of the murder. Harmohinder Sanghera was later found guilty of murder.
III. Protecting vulnerable members of the public
Communications data is used daily to ensure that the emergency services can locate people who may be vulnerable to imminent harm:
* Emergency services use data to identify the location from where an emergency call has been made;
* And to identify the whereabouts of a missing person.
Case study: a kidnap investigation
In 1999, seven Chinese nationals were kidnapped in London after they had been smuggled into the UK, and ransoms demanded from their families in China.
One of the hostages had used the mobile phone of another Chinese migrant to call home the night before. Through communications data the Police were able to identify the destination number in China called by the UK mobile. They then asked UK communications service providers to check whether they had carried a call to that destination number since the man was kidnapped. One provider discovered that it had carried two calls within hours of the kidnap.
From the company’s call data records the Police were able to tie the associated communications data to a number of other mobile phones and to fixed line telephones at a number of addresses. They were also able to identify the numbers being dialled in China, both those linked to the hostages’ families and those linked to the gang members involved in collecting the ransoms. They were also able to identify the telephone numbers in The Netherlands of other gang members about to smuggle the next batch of illegal immigrants into the UK.
From this information the Police were able to put the locations in the UK identified from communications data records under surveillance, and provide the Chinese authorities with intelligence to put the gang extorting the ransoms there under surveillance too.
After nine days the hostages were rescued and 56 people involved in the conspiracy to kidnap were arrested, resulting in a combination of nine convictions, with many others being handed over to the immigration services.
Case study: a coastguard rescue at sea
In June 2008 a series of almost unintelligible mobile phone calls was received by Lincolnshire Police and Yarmouth and Humber Coastguards indicating that a yacht was in trouble in the North Sea. Yarmouth Coastguard requested communications data that enabled the caller’s location to be estimated as two miles off Skegness.
Skegness All-Weather and Inshore Lifeboats were launched to assist and managed to find the yacht which had lost its mast, suffered propeller damage and was taking on water. Of the four people on board, one was very dehydrated from acute sea sickness.
The distressed crew members were taken aboard Skegness Lifeboat and returned safely to shore.
IV. Providing information which enables targeted interception of communications
Access to the content of any communication in transmission under warrant by the law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be personally authorised by the Secretary of State5. Analysis of communications data is an essential precondition of correctly targeted lawful interception. The law requires that interception warrants must describe the communications which are to be intercepted, for example by setting out the address, numbers or other factors that are to be used for identifying the communications that are to be intercepted. Without communications data that would not be possible.
1. This consultation is about why and how communications data is collected, stored, and made available to public authorities. A separate public consultation was launched on 17 April 2009 dealing with the issue of which public authorities should be entitled to obtain communications data under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and for what purposes this should be allowed.
2. Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Report 2007, paragraph 3.7, p8
3. Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Report 2007, paragraph 3.26, p11
4. Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Report 2007, paragraph 3.7, p8
5. Before issuing an interception warrant, the Secretary of State must believe the warrant is necessary in the interests of national security, to safeguard the economic well-being of the UK or to prevent or detect serious crime. Furthermore, the Secretary of State must also believe that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by carrying it out.