Table of Contents
Comments
Commenters1
- University of Cambridge
- Philosophy Faculty
- Reading List 2009-2010
- PART IA PAPER 01: METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
- University of Cambridge- Philosophy Faculty
- Reading List 2009-2010
- PART IA PAPER 01: METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
4
God: existence of; the problem of evil. Causality: regularity; necessitation; determinism and fatalism.
God: existence of; the problem of evil. Causality: regularity; necessitation; determinism and fatalism.7
Articles in the Stanford Encyclopedia (http://plato.stanford.edu) and Routledge Encyclopedia (www.rep.routledge.com) are good introductions on all of these topics.
Articles in the Stanford Encyclopedia (http://plato.stanford.edu) and Routledge Encyclopedia (www.rep.routledge.com) are good introductions on all of these topics. 10
*HUME, D., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. [Far and away the best and most important contribution to this subject.]
*HUME, D., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. [Far and away the best and most important contribution to this subject.] 11
HICK, J., Philosophy of Religion. 4th ed (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989). [chs. 1-4. Clear and readable, but very brief.].
HICK, J., Philosophy of Religion. 4th ed (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989). [chs. 1-4. Clear and readable, but very brief.]. 12
LEPOIDEVIN, R., Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996). [More difficult, but still introductory.].
LEPOIDEVIN, R., Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996). [More difficult, but still introductory.]. 13
ROWE, W., The Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 1993; 4th edition: 2006).
ROWE, W., The Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 1993; 4th edition: 2006). 14
YANDELL, K., Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999). [chs. 9 & 10. More difficult.].
YANDELL, K., Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999). [chs. 9 & 10. More difficult.]. 16
*AQUINAS. ‘Summa Theologiae, Part 1, Question 2, Article 3′, in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, edited by M. Peterson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; 3rd edition: 2006) [The famous 'five ways'.]
*AQUINAS. ‘Summa Theologiae, Part 1, Question 2, Article 3′, in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, edited by M. Peterson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; 3rd edition: 2006) [The famous 'five ways'.] 17
*MACKIE, J.L., The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). [ch. 5 partly repr. in M. Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)].
*MACKIE, J.L., The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). [ch. 5 partly repr. in M. Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)]. 18
*VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd ed (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [ch. 6. Highly recommended.].
*VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd ed (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [ch. 6. Highly recommended.]. 19
LEPOIDEVIN, R., Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996). [chs. 1, 3]. ROWE, W., ‘The Cosmological Argument’, in The Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 1993). Repr. as ‘The cosmological argument’ in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)
Ontological arguments
LEPOIDEVIN, R., Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996). [chs. 1, 3]. ROWE, W., ‘The Cosmological Argument’, in The Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 1993). Repr. as ‘The cosmological argument’ in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)Ontological arguments
20
*VAN INWAGEN, P., ‘Necessary Being: The Ontological Argument’, in Metaphysics (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [ch. 6 (ch. 5 in 1st edition). Also in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) pp. 69-83. A good place to start. Also available on Camtools]
*VAN INWAGEN, P., ‘Necessary Being: The Ontological Argument’, in Metaphysics (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [ch. 6 (ch. 5 in 1st edition). Also in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) pp. 69-83. A good place to start. Also available on Camtools]21
ANSELM. ‘Proslogion’. [Relevant bits repr. in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); also in M. Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Difficult, but brief.]
ANSELM. ‘Proslogion’. [Relevant bits repr. in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); also in M. Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Difficult, but brief.] 23
MALCOLM, N., ‘Anselm’s Ontological Arguments.’ Philosophical Review 69 (1960). Repr. in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). PLANTINGA, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
[ch.10. A similar discussion is 'A contemporary modal version of the ontological argument' in M. Peterson, et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Influential revival of modal argument, criticized by Mackie. Rather difficult. An e-book is available from Oxford Scholarship Online]
MALCOLM, N., ‘Anselm’s Ontological Arguments.’ Philosophical Review 69 (1960). Repr. in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). PLANTINGA, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).[ch.10. A similar discussion is 'A contemporary modal version of the ontological argument' in M. Peterson, et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Influential revival of modal argument, criticized by Mackie. Rather difficult. An e-book is available from Oxford Scholarship Online]
25
*HUME, D., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. [Far and away the best and most important contribution to this subject. An e-book is also available.]
*HUME, D., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. [Far and away the best and most important contribution to this subject. An e-book is also available.] 26
LEPOIDEVIN, R., Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996). [chs. 4 & 5. A good critical discussion, very readable.]
LEPOIDEVIN, R., Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996). [chs. 4 & 5. A good critical discussion, very readable.] 28
VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd ed. (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [chs. 8 & 9 (chs. 7 & 8 in 1st ed.) A very clear, sympathetic discussion.].
VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd ed. (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [chs. 8 & 9 (chs. 7 & 8 in 1st ed.) A very clear, sympathetic discussion.]. 30
*HICK, J., ‘Soul-Making and Suffering’, in The Problem of Evil, edited by M.M. Adams and R.M. Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). [See also his Philosophy of Religion, 4th edn (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989), ch. 4.]
*HICK, J., ‘Soul-Making and Suffering’, in The Problem of Evil, edited by M.M. Adams and R.M. Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). [See also his Philosophy of Religion, 4th edn (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989), ch. 4.] 31
*MACKIE, J.L., ‘Evil and Omnipotence.’ Mind 64 (1955): 200-12. Repr. in B. Mitchell, ed., The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); and in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, eds, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); for a later version, see ch. 9 of his The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982). [An important witness for the prosecution.]
*MACKIE, J.L., ‘Evil and Omnipotence.’ Mind 64 (1955): 200-12. Repr. in B. Mitchell, ed., The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); and in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, eds, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); for a later version, see ch. 9 of his The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982). [An important witness for the prosecution.] 32
PLANTINGA, A., and B. MITCHELL. ‘The Free Will Defence’, in The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). [For a later version see his The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 9; and repr. in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, eds, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); yet another version is 'The free will defense' M. Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).]
PLANTINGA, A., and B. MITCHELL. ‘The Free Will Defence’, in The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). [For a later version see his The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 9; and repr. in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, eds, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); yet another version is 'The free will defense' M. Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1996).]
33
ROWE, W., ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-41. Repr. in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, eds, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). [Highly recommended discussion of the evidential problem of evil.]
ROWE, W., ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-41. Repr. in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, eds, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). [Highly recommended discussion of the evidential problem of evil.]35
VAN INWAGEN, P., ‘The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy.’ Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 161-87. Repr. in his God, Knowledge and Mystery (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995); and in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
VAN INWAGEN, P., ‘The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy.’ Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 161-87. Repr. in his God, Knowledge and Mystery (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995); and in E. Stump and M. J. Murray, eds, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 38
CRANE, T., ‘Causation’, in Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject, edited by
A.C. Grayling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 184-94 [A useful introduction.]
CRANE, T., ‘Causation’, in Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject, edited byA.C. Grayling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 184-94 [A useful introduction.]
39
SALMON, W., ‘Causation’, in The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by R. Gale (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
SALMON, W., ‘Causation’, in The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by R. Gale (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 43
ANSCOMBE, G.E.M., Causality and Determination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) Repr. in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphyisics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); also in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
ANSCOMBE, G.E.M., Causality and Determination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) Repr. in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphyisics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); also in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 44
MACKIE, J.L., The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1974). [chs. 1, 2. Fairly difficult. An e-book is available from Oxford Scholarship Online]
MACKIE, J.L., The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1974). [chs. 1, 2. Fairly difficult. An e-book is available from Oxford Scholarship Online]
45
MELLOR, D.H., ‘On Raising the Chances of Effects’, in Matters of Metaphysics, edited by D.H. Mellor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). [Argues that causes needn't necessitate their effects. Rather difficult.]
MELLOR, D.H., ‘On Raising the Chances of Effects’, in Matters of Metaphysics, edited by D.H. Mellor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). [Argues that causes needn't necessitate their effects. Rather difficult.] 47
BUTTERFIELD, J., ‘Determinism and Indeterminism’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998, 2005)
BUTTERFIELD, J., ‘Determinism and Indeterminism’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998, 2005) 49
EARMAN, J., A Primer on Determinism (Lancaster: Reidel, 1986). [chs. 2, 3. Sophisticated but readable.].
EARMAN, J., A Primer on Determinism (Lancaster: Reidel, 1986). [chs. 2, 3. Sophisticated but readable.].52
*ARISTOTLE. De Interpretatione Repr. in R. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (London: Macmillan, 1968) pp. 179-182. [Also in Camtools]
*ARISTOTLE. De Interpretatione Repr. in R. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (London: Macmillan, 1968) pp. 179-182. [Also in Camtools]53
*CICERO, M.T., ‘De Fato’, in Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes, Vol. 4 (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1942).
*CICERO, M.T., ‘De Fato’, in Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes, Vol. 4 (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1942). 54
*DUMMETT, M., ‘Bringing About the Past.’ Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 338-59. Also in his Truth and Other Enigmas (Duckworth, 1978); and in R. LePoidevin and M. MacBeath, eds, The Philosophy of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). [Difficult]
*DUMMETT, M., ‘Bringing About the Past.’ Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 338-59. Also in his Truth and Other Enigmas (Duckworth, 1978); and in R. LePoidevin and M. MacBeath, eds, The Philosophy of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). [Difficult] 56
MAYO, B., ‘The Open Future.’ Mind 71 (1962): 1-14. R. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (London: Macmillan, 1968). [Defends Aristotelian view.]
MAYO, B., ‘The Open Future.’ Mind 71 (1962): 1-14. R. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (London: Macmillan, 1968). [Defends Aristotelian view.] 58
TAYLOR, R., ‘Fate’, in Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992). An earlier version is ‘Fatalism’, Philosophical Review, 71 (1962), 56- 66. Also in R. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (London: Macmillan, 1968). [Readable defence of fatalism.]
TAYLOR, R., ‘Fate’, in Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992). An earlier version is ‘Fatalism’, Philosophical Review, 71 (1962), 56- 66. Also in R. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (London: Macmillan, 1968). [Readable defence of fatalism.] 59
VAN INWAGEN, P., An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). [ch. 2. Difficult but worth attempting.].
VAN INWAGEN, P., An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). [ch. 2. Difficult but worth attempting.]. 63
*VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd edn. (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [ch. 12 (ch. 11 in 1st ed.). A good introduction.].
*VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd edn. (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [ch. 12 (ch. 11 in 1st ed.). A good introduction.]. 64
AYER, A.J., ‘Freedom and Necessity’, in Philosophical Essays, edited by A.J. Ayer (London: Macmillan, 2003). Repr. in G. Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [Brief defence of compatibilism.]
AYER, A.J., ‘Freedom and Necessity’, in Philosophical Essays, edited by A.J. Ayer (London: Macmillan, 2003). Repr. in G. Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [Brief defence of compatibilism.] 65
CHISHOLM, R., ‘Human Freedom and the Self’, in Free Will, edited by G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). [Classic statement of agent-causation view.]
CHISHOLM, R., ‘Human Freedom and the Self’, in Free Will, edited by G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). [Classic statement of agent-causation view.] 66
FISCHER, J.M., The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). [ch. 4. Readable defence of compatibilism against P. van Inwagen-style arguments.].
FISCHER, J.M., The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). [ch. 4. Readable defence of compatibilism against P. van Inwagen-style arguments.]. 67
FRANKFURT, H., ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.’ Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20. Repr. in G. Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [Influential attempt to account for freedom in terms of second-order desires.]
FRANKFURT, H., ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.’ Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20. Repr. in G. Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [Influential attempt to account for freedom in terms of second-order desires.] 68
HAYEK, F., The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960). [Liberty is freedom from coercion. chs 1,5].
HAYEK, F., The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960). [Liberty is freedom from coercion. chs 1,5]. 69
HOBART, R.E., ‘Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It.’ Mind 43 (1934). Repr. in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); and in B. Berofsky, ed., Free Will and Determinism (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).
HOBART, R.E., ‘Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It.’ Mind 43 (1934). Repr. in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); and in B. Berofsky, ed., Free Will and Determinism (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 70
KANE, R., The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). SCHLICK, M., ‘When Is a Man Responsible?’ in Free Will and Determinism, edited by B. Berofsky (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). [Another version of compatibilism. Quite readable.]
KANE, R., The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). SCHLICK, M., ‘When Is a Man Responsible?’ in Free Will and Determinism, edited by B. Berofsky (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). [Another version of compatibilism. Quite readable.] 71
STRAWSON, P.F., ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Free Will, edited by G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
STRAWSON, P.F., ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Free Will, edited by G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 72
VAN INWAGEN, P., ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.’ Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 185-99. Repr. in G. Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [Fairly difficult. More ambitious readers may want to consult his An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)]
VAN INWAGEN, P., ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.’ Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 185-99. Repr. in G. Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [Fairly difficult. More ambitious readers may want to consult his An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)] 74
*DESCARTES, R., Meditations on First Philosophy Relevant bits repr. in D. M.
Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). [2, 6. Classic source on dualism.].
*DESCARTES, R., Meditations on First Philosophy Relevant bits repr. in D. M.Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). [2, 6. Classic source on dualism.].
75
*PUTNAM, H., ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in Analytical Philosophy, 2nd Series, edited by R.J. Butler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). Also in N. Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (London: Methuen, 1980); and in D. M. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 151-59. 1-19 [Important essay, fairly difficult. Also on Camtools]
*PUTNAM, H., ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in Analytical Philosophy, 2nd Series, edited by R.J. Butler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). Also in N. Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (London: Methuen, 1980); and in D. M. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 151-59. 1-19 [Important essay, fairly difficult. Also on Camtools] 76
*RYLE, G., The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949). [Esp. chs. 1, 2, 4.
Highly influential, but not very clear as a statement of behaviourism.].
*RYLE, G., The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949). [Esp. chs. 1, 2, 4.Highly influential, but not very clear as a statement of behaviourism.].
77
*SMART, J.J.C., ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 141-56. Repr. in D. M. Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and in W. Lyons, ed., Modern Philosophy of Mind (London: Dent, 1995); and in C. V. Borst, ed., Mind-brain Identity Theory: a collection of papers (London: Macmillan, 1970).
*SMART, J.J.C., ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 141-56. Repr. in D. M. Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and in W. Lyons, ed., Modern Philosophy of Mind (London: Dent, 1995); and in C. V. Borst, ed., Mind-brain Identity Theory: a collection of papers (London: Macmillan, 1970). 78
CARRUTHERS, P., Introducing Persons (London: Routledge, 1986). [Approaches the issues from an epistemological point of view.].
CARRUTHERS, P., Introducing Persons (London: Routledge, 1986). [Approaches the issues from an epistemological point of view.]. 79
CRANE, T., The Mechanical Mind. 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2003). [Introduction and ch. 2. Also available as an e-book]
CRANE, T., The Mechanical Mind. 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2003). [Introduction and ch. 2. Also available as an e-book] 80
HEIL, J., Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2004). [More difficult.].
HEIL, J., Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2004). [More difficult.]. 81
LEWIS, D., ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory.’ Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 17-25. Repr. in his Philosophical Papers, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) An e-book is available from Oxford Scholarship Online.
LEWIS, D., ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory.’ Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 17-25. Repr. in his Philosophical Papers, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) An e-book is available from Oxford Scholarship Online. 82
LEWIS, D., ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, edited by N. Block (London: Methuen, 1980). Repr. in his Philosophical Papers, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); [A subtle variant on the usual view. Fairly difficult.]
LEWIS, D., ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, edited by N. Block (London: Methuen, 1980). Repr. in his Philosophical Papers, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); [A subtle variant on the usual view. Fairly difficult.] 83
LOWE, E.J., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000). [ch. 3]. MASLIN, K.T., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). [Written for sixth-form students, but serious enough to be useful]
LOWE, E.J., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000). [ch. 3]. MASLIN, K.T., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). [Written for sixth-form students, but serious enough to be useful]
84
SMITH, P., and O.R. JONES, The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) [Perhaps the best introductory book.]
SMITH, P., and O.R. JONES, The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) [Perhaps the best introductory book.] 85
VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd ed (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [chs. 10, 11 (chs. 9, 10 in 1st edition). Critical but fair; very clear]
VAN INWAGEN, P., Metaphysics. 2nd ed (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2002). [chs. 10, 11 (chs. 9, 10 in 1st edition). Critical but fair; very clear] 86
WILLIAMS, B., Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin, 1978). [chs. 4 &10. Examines elaborated versions of Descartes' arguments. Also available as an e-book]
WILLIAMS, B., Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin, 1978). [chs. 4 &10. Examines elaborated versions of Descartes' arguments. Also available as an e-book] 89
*LOCKE, J., Essay Concerning Human Understanding Partly reprinted in J. Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975). [book II, ch. I, §§10-12, and ch. xxvii. Important historical source. Difficult.]
*LOCKE, J., Essay Concerning Human Understanding Partly reprinted in J. Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975). [book II, ch. I, §§10-12, and ch. xxvii. Important historical source. Difficult.] 90
*PARFIT, D., ‘Personal Identity.’ Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. Repr. in J.
Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975). [Classic statement of the view that 'identity doesn't matter'. More ambitious readers can consult his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chs. 10-13.]
*PARFIT, D., ‘Personal Identity.’ Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. Repr. in J.Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975). [Classic statement of the view that 'identity doesn't matter'. More ambitious readers can consult his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chs. 10-13.]
91
*WILLIAMS, B., ‘The Self and the Future.’ Philosophical Review 79 (1970): 161-80. Also in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and in *J. Barresi and R. Martin, eds, Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002)
*WILLIAMS, B., ‘The Self and the Future.’ Philosophical Review 79 (1970): 161-80. Also in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and in *J. Barresi and R. Martin, eds, Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) 92
NOONAN, H., Personal Identity. 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2003). [chs. 1, 7, 10. A useful survey, but difficult in places. Also available as e-book]
NOONAN, H., Personal Identity. 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2003). [chs. 1, 7, 10. A useful survey, but difficult in places. Also available as e-book] 93
OLSON, E., ‘An Argument for Animalism’, in Personal Identity, edited by J. Barresi and R. Martin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). [Argues against psychological views. More ambitious readers can consult his The Human Animal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).]
OLSON, E., ‘An Argument for Animalism’, in Personal Identity, edited by J. Barresi and R. Martin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). [Argues against psychological views. More ambitious readers can consult his The Human Animal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).] 94
OLSON, E., ‘Personal Identity’, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, edited by S. Stich and T. Warfield (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). [A useful overview. A similar essay can be found on-line in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.]
OLSON, E., ‘Personal Identity’, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, edited by S. Stich and T. Warfield (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). [A useful overview. A similar essay can be found on-line in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] 95
PERRY, J., ed. Personal Identity (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975), [Selections from Locke, Butler, Reid, and Hume.].
PERRY, J., ed. Personal Identity (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975), [Selections from Locke, Butler, Reid, and Hume.]. 96
SHOEMAKER, S., and R. SWINBURNE, Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) Excerpts also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). [The best introductory book.].
SHOEMAKER, S., and R. SWINBURNE, Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) Excerpts also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds, Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). [The best introductory book.]. 97
WILLIAMS, B., ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1956). Also in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
WILLIAMS, B., ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1956). Also in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 100
*DESCARTES, R., Meditations, 1. *HUME, D., A Treatise of Human Nature. [book I, part IV, section 2. Very difficult. An e-book is available from: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705
*DESCARTES, R., Meditations, 1. *HUME, D., A Treatise of Human Nature. [book I, part IV, section 2. Very difficult. An e-book is available from: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705 101
*RUSSELL, B., The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1912). [chs. 1-3]. AUDI, R., Epistemology (London: Routledge, 1998, 2nd ed.: 2002). [ch 10. Very clear and readable. Chs. 7 and 8 are very useful background.].
*RUSSELL, B., The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1912). [chs. 1-3]. AUDI, R., Epistemology (London: Routledge, 1998, 2nd ed.: 2002). [ch 10. Very clear and readable. Chs. 7 and 8 are very useful background.].
103
CHISHOLM, R., Theory of Knowledge. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977) [ch. 1.]
CHISHOLM, R., Theory of Knowledge. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977) [ch. 1.] 104
CRAIG, E., ‘Nozick and the Sceptic.’ Analysis 49 (1989): 161-62. DANCY, J., Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). [chs. 1-3. Excellent introduction.]
CRAIG, E., ‘Nozick and the Sceptic.’ Analysis 49 (1989): 161-62. DANCY, J., Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). [chs. 1-3. Excellent introduction.] 105
GRIFFITHS, A.P., ed. Knowledge and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1967), [Papers by Pritchard, Malcolm and Gettier.].
GRIFFITHS, A.P., ed. Knowledge and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1967), [Papers by Pritchard, Malcolm and Gettier.].
106
MOORE, G.E., ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in Philosophical Papers, edited by
G.E. Moore (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959).
MOORE, G.E., ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in Philosophical Papers, edited byG.E. Moore (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959).
108
UNGER, P., ‘A Defense of Skepticism.’ Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 198-219. Repr. in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [Influential defence of scepticism. Fairly difficult. Ambitious students can consult his Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)]
UNGER, P., ‘A Defense of Skepticism.’ Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 198-219. Repr. in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [Influential defence of scepticism. Fairly difficult. Ambitious students can consult his Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)] 109
WILLIAMS, B., Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin, 1978). [chs. 2-3. Fairly difficult. Also available as an e-book]
WILLIAMS, B., Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin, 1978). [chs. 2-3. Fairly difficult. Also available as an e-book] 110
WILLIAMS, M., ‘Skepticism’, in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by J. Greco and E. Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). [Excellent introduction]
WILLIAMS, M., ‘Skepticism’, in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by J. Greco and E. Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). [Excellent introduction] 112
*GOODMAN, N., Fact, Fiction and Forecast. 4th ed (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1983). [chs. 3-4. Classic source on the 'new riddle' of induction.].
*GOODMAN, N., Fact, Fiction and Forecast. 4th ed (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1983). [chs. 3-4. Classic source on the 'new riddle' of induction.].
113
*HUME, D., Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. [§ 4. Classic source on the 'old riddle' of induction. Ebook available from: http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/
*HUME, D., Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. [§ 4. Classic source on the 'old riddle' of induction. Ebook available from: http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/ 114
BLACK, M., Problems of Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954) [ch. 11. A readable defence of the bootstrapping approach. Also in Camtools]
BLACK, M., Problems of Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954) [ch. 11. A readable defence of the bootstrapping approach. Also in Camtools] 115
KAPLAN, M., ‘Epistemic Issues in Induction’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998). [A useful survey. http://www.rep.routledge.com
KAPLAN, M., ‘Epistemic Issues in Induction’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998). [A useful survey. http://www.rep.routledge.com 116
MELLOR, D.H., ‘The Warrant of Induction’, in Matters of Metaphysics, edited by D.H. Mellor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). [Fairly difficult defence of the reliabilist solution.]
MELLOR, D.H., ‘The Warrant of Induction’, in Matters of Metaphysics, edited by D.H. Mellor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). [Fairly difficult defence of the reliabilist solution.] 118
SAINSBURY, R.M., Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). [§ 6.1]. SKYRMS, B., Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. 3rd ed (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1986). [chs. 1-3].
SAINSBURY, R.M., Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). [§ 6.1]. SKYRMS, B., Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. 3rd ed (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1986). [chs. 1-3]. 120
WILLIAMS, M., Problems of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). [chs. 17, 18, pp. 201-219. Sophisticated yet accessible.].
WILLIAMS, M., Problems of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). [chs. 17, 18, pp. 201-219. Sophisticated yet accessible.].